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This explains clearly enough in what sense it is meant that the ethical process is at once opposed to and part of the cosmic process. Even so, however, it must be admitted that Professor Huxley, as was natural perhaps in a popular lecture, has expressed the antagonism of "nature" and "spirit" somewhat too broadly, since that which regulates and "modifies" the cosmic process cannot rightly be said to have "no sort of relation" and "be in all respects opposed" to it.

The main object of this discussion is the same as that of the short paper on "Social Evolution and Social Duty," and of the replies to the criticisms of Professor Cairnes and M. de Laveleye,—viz., to point out the important place which has been given in the Spencerian system to the altruistic activities and social agencies, and to rebut the charges of a "brutal individualism" brought against it. The disadvantage to the general reader in following these discussions is that only one side is given; and, although large questions are involved, the argument turns directly on statements and expression of which he has not the text by him. Another drawback to the reprinting of magazine controversies between zealous philosophers is that they are apt to be conducted with an acrimony to which it seems a pity to give permanence. This is notably the case with the fragment entitled "Professor Tait on the Formula of Evolution."

The close student of Mr. Spencer, however, will no doubt find it useful to refer to the volume for further elucidation of those points of his system which have called forth most criticism.

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THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

By J. F. Herbart. Translated and edited, with Notes and Introductions, by Beatrice C. Mulliner, B.A. Lond. Pp. cxxv., 229. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

THE HERBARTIAN PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc. Pp. iv., 284. London: Isbister & Co.

"Herbartian literature," says Mr. Adams, "is springing up in almost alarming luxuriance." But all who believe in a science of education will be glad to offer a more or less unqualified welcome to such literature. For at the present time any scientific treatment

of education is sure to be to some extent Herbartian in form, if not in idea. At the same time the thoughtful educator who is not a mere partisan cannot but recognize the existence of a danger of an uncritical acceptance of Herbart's doctrines. For Herbart's educational theory is the outcome of the union of his psychology and his ethics, and his psychology is inseparably connected with his metaphysics. But his metaphysics seems to us to be false, and his ethics insufficient and unsatisfactory. Moreover, Herbart's psychology was, in his own view, nothing if not mathematical—a statics and dynamics of mental life. But the futility of his efforts in this direction is now generally recognized. Whilst, then, we may accept much of Herbart's work as offering a convenient description of many aspects of mental life, we cannot accept his psychological hypothesis as a satisfactory explanation of that life. Those who agree with us in this must decline to accept Herbartianism as a true and complete theory of education. They may recognize much of the highest value and importance in it, they may thankfully accept its help in organizing the work of instruction, but after all they must refuse to find in it the whole truth. "The soul," says Herbart, "has no capacity nor faculty whatever, either to receive or to produce anything." Those who thoroughly accept this position must also accept Herbart's doctrine when he says, "I confess to have no conception of education without instruction." Indeed, all education is instruction if the mind is to be built up of ideas according to the Herbartian psychology, for even example and "discipline" can only be efficacious if they supply ideas which can attain and hold a dominant place in that internecine strife of ideas which is, for Herbart, the totality of mental life. Doubtless, it is difficult to consistently maintain this position of soul passivity, and the most thorough-going Herbartian may even speak—as Miss Mulliner does—of mind as "giving the unity" to complexes of impressions; the soul with no activity but that of self-preservation is found insufficient when one comes to deal with actual human life.

It is for reasons such as we have indicated that we believe more good will be done by books like that of Mr. Adams than by translations such as Miss Mulliner's. In her Preface to the latter, Miss Beale says, "It would be contrary to the spirit of the Master if we adopted his system as a complete whole," and she adds: "We must have, so to speak, a 'native' ministry." This is exactly what we ourselves feel. We must take what we find valuable in Herbart

and leave the rest, whether, indeed, our selection is "contrary to the spirit of the Master" or not. This is what Mr. Adams does, and does consciously, saying, indeed, that "no doubt the old philosopher would turn in his grave did he know that we were dropping what he considered the most essential part of his work." Mr. Adams recognizes that "Herbartianism has weaknesses;" hence, though his essays "are written with a Herbartian bias," yet "it does not follow that the writer is a Herbartian." Indeed, he shows that—at any rate, in his opinion—the greatest contributions of Herbartianism to pedagogy may be reached on quite a different psychological hypothesis from that of Herbart's elastic, indestructible, and essentially unchangeable ideas. Mr. Adams's position towards theories of psychology is indeed of a somewhat cavalier character: "There may be a one true and living psychology before which all the rest must bow, but in the meantime it has not made good its claims." All existing systems may, therefore, be regarded as hypotheses, and the teacher should select that which promises to be most useful in meeting his needs. Of course, this is open to the retort that if education is really to be an application of psychology, then, unless the psychology is true, the education must be mistaken. To take a psychology because it fits in with educational practice is largely to invert the relative positions of the two sciences. No doubt, Herbartian psychology, when treated and applied as in Mr. Adams's book, becomes educationally fruitful, even if it does not remain strictly Herbartian. Indeed, we know of no more suggestive and stimulating book among the publications of recent years than this of Mr. Adams. It is everywhere marked by a pretty humor, and the illustrations are such as really illustrate. We think it would have been even better had the statement of psychology in Chapter III. been less Herbartian in form, for many of the conclusions are such as can only be called Herbartian by a use of the term so wide as to be misleading. Indeed, as Mr. Adams himself says at the end of his book: "This outcome of his work would no doubt have greatly surprised Johann Friedrich Herbart." He ends by suggesting that it is in a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel on Hegelian principles that the true educational doctrine is to be found. This we believe to be the case, but then we cannot get such a synthesis without breaking away from Herbart's atomistic psychology. Mr. Adams thinks such a synthesis "would not be excessively difficult." Whilst grateful for what he has given us, we wish he would undertake that task also.

Of quite a different character is Miss Mulliner's book. It consists of an excellent translation of Froebel's unfinished "Letters on the Application of Psychology to the Science of Education," with useful explanatory notes and an introduction giving an outline of Herbartianism in all its aspects. Miss Mulliner is apparently a very enthusiastic disciple of the school of Jena, and her Introduction is pitched in a key of the warmest eulogy. But in such a brief space it was, of course, impossible to be either deep or thorough, and considering that several excellent general introductions to Herbartianism already exist, Miss Mulliner would, perhaps, have been better advised in limiting the extent and increasing the intent of her remarks. For we cannot help thinking that those who will profit from the letters will not benefit from the milk for Herbartian babes offered in the Introduction, whilst those who need the latter had better avoid for a time the strong meat of the former. For, indeed, these letters are by no means easy reading. Miss Mulliner scarcely seems to recognize how difficult they are, for she apparently thinks that the greater part of them will find acceptance with "the general reader" (cf. notes, pp. 148, 182). We doubt this very much, whilst we do not doubt at all that the same "general reader," were he to read them, would find them largely unintelligible. For Herbart assumes a knowledge of his own psychological positions and writings of which the general reader would certainly be innocent. References to his "Psychology" are scattered throughout these letters, and the acceptance of Herbartian mathematical psychology is taken as a matter of course. And we must go further and say that for those who are familiar with Herbartianism, these letters will be disappointingly bare of suggestion and inspiration. They are unsystematic, they are dull and heavy, they involve a large amount of obsolete physiology, and they really seem—in Herbart's own words—"to take us no further than to a repetition of that which every experienced practical teacher already knows." No doubt the professed Herbartian will be glad to have some more of the Master's work in an English dress, but we do not think any others will derive either pleasure or profit from the letters. We are sure that a perusal of them will not aid the inexperienced teacher in his work, whilst the student of pedagogy will not find in them anything with which he is not already familiar.

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